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We evaluate the use of data obtained by illicit means against
a broad set of ethical and legal issues. Our analysis covers
both the direct collection, and secondary uses of, data ob-
tained via illicit means such as exploiting a vulnerability, or
unauthorized disclosure. We extract ethical principles from
existing advice and guidance and analyse how they have been
applied within more than 20 recent peer reviewed papers that
deal with illicitly obtained datasets. We find that existing
advice and guidance does not address all of the problems that
researchers have faced and explain how the papers tackle
ethical issues inconsistently, and sometimes not at all. Our
analysis reveals not only a lack of application of safeguards
but also that legitimate ethical justifications for research are
being overlooked. In many cases positive benefits, as well as
potential harms, remain entirely unidentified. Few papers
record explicit Research Ethics Board (REB) approval for
the activity that is described and the justifications given for
exemption suggest deficiencies in the REB process.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The scientific method requires empirical evidence to test
hypotheses. Consequently, both the gathering, and the use
of, data is an essential component of science and supports
evidence-based decision making. Computer scientists make
significant use of data to support research and inform policy,
and this includes data which was obtained through illegal or
unethical behaviour.
In this paper we consider the ethical and legal issues sur-
rounding the use of datasets of illicit origin, which we define
as data collected as a result of (i) the exploitation of a vulner-
ability in a computer system; (ii) an unintended disclosure
by the data owner; or (iii) an unauthorized leak by someone
with access to the data.
The collection, or use, of a dataset of illicit origin to support
research can be advantageous. For example, legitimate access
to data may not be possible, or the reuse of data of illicit
origin is likely to require fewer resources than collecting data
again from scratch. In addition, the sharing and reuse of
existing datasets aids reproducibility, an important scientific
goal. The disadvantage is that ethical and legal questions
may arise as a result of the use of such data.
There is evidence that some researchers who use datasets
of illicit origin consider ethical and legal issues, particularly
through the introduction of ethical consideration sections
into papers [83] and the development and use of institutional
resources such as Research Ethics Boards (REBs) [26]. Un-
fortunately, our work shows that neither is common practice,
and even where they are tackled, ethical and legal consid-
erations often appear incomplete. It therefore follows that
potential harms may have taken place which might otherwise
have been mitigated or avoided. Research that lacks sufficient
ethical consideration may still be ethical, but it is difficult to
assess this.
General guidance, such as that provided by the Menlo
Report [28], provides useful advice, but does not address all
the issues that arise in using data of illicit origin. Academic
discussions have taken place [32], and there are blog posts and
other informal articles by academics on the topic [119, 124],
but to date there is little in the way of detailed analysis, or
a systematisation of knowledge, which explores this problem
in depth.
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The goal of this paper is to address this gap and provide a
detailed evaluation of the use of data of illicit origin in peer-
reviewed research, and to support the development of a more
nuanced understanding of the issues and problems in this
space. We do this by first reviewing previous work to identify
the ethical (§2) and legal (§3) issues that can arise. We then
analyse over 20 recent peer-reviewed papers which make
use of data of illicit origin (§4), and systematize (Table 1)
the ethical and legal decisions made against a common set
of justifications, safeguards, potential harms and potential
benefits (§5).
2 ETHICS
Ethical norms are constantly changing with research ethics
developing over the course of the 20th century and becoming
more prominent in our field in the 21st century. Previous
work related to the ethical use of data of illicit origin spans a
number of topics, including informed consent, human rights,
releasing and using shared data, hacking, analysis techniques,
ethical review, and Research Ethics Boards (REBs). We
consider each of these in turn.
Informed consent: The earliest work on the ethics of
computer-monitored data explored informed consent and
emphasised the right of withdrawal as well as the importance
of data anonymisation [89]. The first difficulty with data of
illicit origin is that it is not always possible to meet these re-
quirements. Acquiring consent from users involved in leaked
data is challenging, particularly if they are involved in illegal
activities [72]. In the case of data obtained from underground
marketplaces, covert research without consent is necessary to
understand what is traded due to the illegality of the goods
bought or sold – consent could affect the results [101]. This
is one of the exceptions for informed consent in the ethics
statement of the British Society of Criminology, which states
that “covert research may be allowed where the ends might
be thought to justify the means” [23].
In cases where consent is possible, previous work has con-
cluded that if informed consent has been given on the basis
of a promise of confidentiality by the researcher, then re-
searchers should take particular care to ensure that they are
willing to keep the promises they make, particularly if doing
so might require them to break the law [52].
Where informed consent is impossible to obtain, the Menlo
Report recommends that the REB must protect the interests
of the individuals [26]. Thus, the REB has a particularly
important role to play in research which makes use of data
of illicit origin where informed consent is not possible [23].
Human rights: Human rights also provide an important
ethical baseline. These include, the right to life, the right
to be free of arbitrary arrest, the right to a fair trial, a
presumption of innocence until proven guilty, a right to not
have arbitrary invasions of privacy, and a right not to be
arbitrarily deprived of property [112]. Research using data of
illicit origin may indirectly deprive people of such rights and
so this needs to be considered. For example, in Philippines
in 2016, suspected illegal drug users or dealers were subject
to extra-judicial assassination [6] and hence care would need
to be taken with data collected from online drug markets to
ensure this did not result in such abuse.
Releasing and using shared data: The WECSR workshop
in 2012 convened a panel of experts from different domains
who agreed that research involving data of illicit origin would
need to have a clear benefit to society [32]. They also argued
that simply because data is public does not exempt research
using such data from obtaining REB approval since it might
contain personally identifiable information. This echoes the
Menlo Report’s suggestion that the REB must protect the
interests of individuals where informed consent is impossible.
Sharing of datasets is beneficial for data science, but the
purpose and scope for using such data must be stated [19].
Allman and Paxson discussed the ethical issues of releasing
data, using data released by others, and the interactions
between providers and users of data [4]. A key ethical consid-
eration in this context is privacy protection. It is likely that
data of illicit origin was not intended for research purposes or
public exposure, and thus it may not be anonymised. In such
cases, the raw dataset should not be shared publicly, and
research conducted with such data should aim to preserve
privacy. Researchers who hold data of illicit origin should
only provide details of their source or (as Allman and Paxson
suggest) share data with verified researchers under a written
acceptable usage policy. None of the papers we discuss later
took this approach. Partridge argues that papers in network
measurement research should have an ethics section, partly to
increase the availability of examples of ethical reasoning [83].
We show in §5 that few papers using data of illicit origin
have an ethics section.
Both Allman & Paxson, and Partridge warn against relying
on the anonymisation of data since deanonymisation tech-
niques are often surprisingly powerful. Robust anonymisation
of data is difficult, particularly when it has high dimensional-
ity, as the anonymisation is likely to lead to an unacceptable
level of data loss [3].
Hacking and intervening: Hacking into computers to ex-
tract information is usually unethical [102] and illegal. Moore
and Clayton considered ethical dilemmas in take-down re-
search resulting from nine dilemmas they faced during their
research. They considered the balance between reducing
harm uncovered during measurements and the accuracy of
such measurements, the dangers of telling criminals the flaws
in their systems and the importance of ensuring that pro-
posed interventions are likely to work [75]. Dittrich et al.
provide two case studies on ethical decision making for remote
mitigation of botnets [29]. They discuss the ethical issues
involved including the reasons for and against intervening.
Analysis techniques: The ethics committee of the Associa-
tion of Internet Researchers’ (AoIR) has produced guidance
for ethical decision making in Internet research in 2002 [33]
and 2012 [71]. This cross-disciplinary work provides useful
questions to aid researchers in considering the ethics of their
research and defines a process for ethical decision making.
AoIR aimed to publish case studies of the application of their
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guidelines but this has not yet happened. This paper consid-
ers over 20 papers which might have used the AoIR ethics
guidelines but only one of them (§4.3.2) did so. Keegan
and Matias developed a multi-party risk benefit framework
for use in analysing ethical considerations for online com-
munity research [56]. While this was implicitly intended for
research surrounding particular online community platforms,
the same principles apply to research that considers the on-
line community of the Internet, and so it may be a helpful
technique.
Ethical review: The Menlo Report [28] and its compan-
ion [26] are the primary reference on ethical practice in
Information Communication Technology Research (ICTR),
particularly for USA-based researchers. It includes numerous
questions to help researchers consider ethical issues and case
studies to illustrate their application. It identifies that ICTR
has a greater scale, speed, coupling, decentralisation, distribu-
tion, and opacity than traditional human subject research and
hence it re-examines the particular ethical principles required
to evaluate ICTR. It identifies four ethical principles [26,
§B]: Respect for persons: individuals should be treated
as autonomous agents and persons with diminished autonomy
should be given additional protection. Beneficence: min-
imise possible harms, and maximise possible benefits. The
researcher should also use safeguards against potential harms.
Justice: risks and benefits should be distributed fairly and
not on the basis of protected characteristics such as race,
or other characteristics that correlated with protected ones.
Respect for law and public interest: in general ethical
research conforms to applicable laws in relevant jurisdictions.
Research should always be in the public interest. Addition-
ally, research should be open, transparent, reproducible and
peer-reviewed.
Research Ethics Boards (REBs): Program committees or
journal editors are able to review the ethics of work after
it has been conducted but before it is published. REBs,
known as Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) in many US
institutions or Ethics Committees in some UK institutions,
review the ethics of proposed research before it is conducted.
Many REBs were originally formed in response to a review
of the ethics of medical research following revelations of un-
ethical medical research conducted prior to the 1970s [26,
§A.1]. In this context there were clearly human subjects who
had rights that needed to be protected. The term “human
subject” is now deprecated in ethical review in favour of
considering the wide variety of people who might be “par-
ticipants” in the research, even if they are not aware the
research is being conducted. However, some REBs are still
structured around serving this original purpose, and thus
they lack the expertise to understand ICTR or the process
to evaluate research whose risks and challenges differ from
a medical trial. Such structures discourage researchers from
using REBs as they do not add value and may introduce
many months of delay. By contrast other REBs (such as ours
in Cambridge) have ICTR specialists and aim to provide a
response in five working days for simple cases. In general
REBs are required because researchers are biased when as-
sessing the ethics of their own research [26]. REBs can help
researchers identify additional safeguards or improvements
in experimental design that make the work ethical, and can
help protect researchers from liability.
2.1 Ethical issues
In order to support analysis of case studies in §4, we now
list the set of ethical issues that require consideration when
conducting research with data of illicit origin:
Identification of stakeholders: The primary, secondary,
and key stakeholders should be identified to support the
analysis of the potential harms and benefits of the research.
Primary stakeholders are those directly connected with data,
such as those identified in it; secondary stakeholders are
intermediaries in the delivery of benefits or harms, such as
service providers; and key stakeholders are those such as the
leaker or the researcher who are critical to the conduct of
the research.
Informed consent: In most of the research we consider it
was impossible or impractical to obtain informed consent
from the primary, and in some cases secondary, stakeholders.
However, research may be designed such that informed con-
sent is not required. Since none of the case studies we have
considered obtained informed consent for their use of data of
illicit origin, we do not consider it in later analysis.
Identify harms: The potential harms arising from the use
of the data of illicit origin should be identified.
Safeguards: Researchers should apply mechanisms to miti-
gate or reduce the potential for harm.
Justice: The research does not unfairly advantage or dis-
advantage any particular social or cultural group.
Public interest: The research has been published, is repro-
ducible, and there is a “social acceptability” exceeding the
harms [35].
3 LEGAL ISSUES
Legal issues surrounding research with data collected ille-
gally can be complex, particularly as the laws of multiple
jurisdictions are likely to be applicable. We are not lawyers
and researchers should seek their own legal advice. Countries
whose laws that may apply to research being conducted in-
clude those where individuals or systems that these data refer
to reside, the countries where data was stored, the countries
where the researchers conducted the research, and possibly
also any countries that data transited during any part of
this process. Researchers often travel and so they should
consider the impact of committing offences, both in their
home jurisdiction and in countries that they visit or that
they might be extradited to.
The key legal issues applicable to research with data of
illicit origin are as follows:
Computer Misuse: Most jurisdictions now have laws against
the misuse or abuse of computers such as the UK [21], the
US [1], and Germany [38, 39, 40, 41]. These can cover generic
actions such as the unauthorised use of a computer system
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(even if there was no technical measure in place to prevent
it), and the use of malware, or ‘dual use’ tools that may be
used for malicious purposes.
Copyright: The right to produce copies, including, in some
jurisdictions, database rights, and trade secrets may apply to
data obtained by researchers. In particular, it may affect the
further sharing of data with other researchers as that might
constitute the creation of copies. There are exemptions to
copyright such as “fair use”, which vary with jurisdiction.
Data Privacy: Data may contain personally identifiable
information which may mean it needs to be protected and
processed in accordance with relevant Data Privacy and Data
Protection rules. In several jurisdictions IP addresses may
be considered personal data, which complicates their use,
particularly where consent has not been obtained. This is
the case in Germany [115, p29], though a European Court of
Justice ruling has found that personally identifiable data can
still be processed without consent for security purposes (e.g.
IP addresses in web server logs) [48]. There is an exemption
for the use of the personal data in Germany “if it is necessary
for a research entity in order to conduct a scientific research,
the scientific interest to conduct the research project substan-
tially predominates over the interest of the data subject in
exclusion of the change of purpose the data was collected for,
and if the research cannot be conducted otherwise or can oth-
erwise be conducted under disproportional effort.” (German
Federal Data Protection Code §28.2.3 [115]).
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [22]
applies from May 2018 to the collection and processing of
personal data in the EU and to organisations that offer goods
or services to individuals in the EU [50]. It provides specific
measures to allow processing of personal data for scientific
research in the public interest, subject to appropriate safe-
guards such as encryption, pseudonymisation, and data min-
imisation. It mentions that scientific research should increase
knowledge and that personal data should not be included
in publications. It specifically allows the processing of data
collected for other purposes for scientific or historical research
(Article 5). It requires (Article 14.5.b) that the interests of
data subjects be protected and that information about the
data collected, how it is being processed and safeguarded,
and who is responsible be made publicly available. It encour-
ages the use of approved codes of conduct surrounding data
processing and it may be helpful for research communities
to develop such codes of conduct. Penalties for violating
the GDPR include fines of up to EUR 20 million, or 4% of
worldwide turnover, whichever is higher.
Terrorism: In some jurisdictions (e.g. UK) it may be an
offence to fail to report terrorist activity [108], including any
discovered during a research project. Additionally, possession
of terrorist materials may be an offence unless specific excep-
tions for research are met. REB approval and institutional
oversight are likely to be necessary if the research involves
terrorist materials, such as discussion of planned attacks or
techniques, to ensure the researcher is protected [113].
Indecent images: Possession of indecent images of children
is an offence in many jurisdictions including the UK [88],
USA [2], and Germany [37]. In general there are no exemp-
tions for research. Hence, care may need to be taken when
scraping or receiving some types of data dump in case they
contain such material.
National Security: Data obtained may be protected by
national security legislation. Therefore unauthorised use
or publication of these data may expose the researchers to
legal risks. Even if data is publicly available it may still be
classified [36]. This is discussed further in §4.5.2.
Contracts: Researchers may be exposed to civil liability
resulting from breach of contract by using certain data if
doing so violates terms of service or other contracts that
researchers have agreed to.
Occasionally research may be illegal but still ethical. In
such cases researchers should be transparent about what
they are doing and both they and their institutions should
be willing to accept the consequences. REB approval is
essential in such cases. In such circumstances researchers
should actively engage with lawmakers to improve the law
so that the ethical work that they want to do is made legal
in future [52].
There are generic defences against legal liability that may
apply. Mens rea: In some cases if the researcher can demon-
strate lack of criminal intent then a criminal prosecution
cannot succeed; REB approval may be a useful way to demon-
strate this. Not in the public interest to prosecute: This is
an especially generic defence, but it is uncertain.
The use of an REB may transfer legal risks to the re-
searcher’s institution or ensure that the institution provides
legal assistance to the researcher. This alone is a strong
incentive for individual researchers to use an REB.
3.1 Related work on law and ICTR
Others have discussed legal issues in ICTR for particular
kinds of research in particular jurisdictions.
Soghoian discusses legal risk arising from conducting phish-
ing experiments, with four case studies and a discussion of
the copyright, trespass to chattel, trademark, terms of ser-
vice violation, computer fraud, and anti-phishing issues in
the USA [100]. He recommends all such research should be
subject to ethical review as well as legal advice, and that the
institution IT staff and anyone else likely to receive a cease
and desist letter related to the project should be consulted.
He also notes the importance of not gaining any financial
benefit from the work, for example, adverts should not be
shown on pages associated with the work.
Ohm et al. examine the legal issues for network measure-
ment research arising from USA Federal Law [81]. They
suggest capturing only the required data, scrubbing IP ad-
dresses, encrypting data when not analysing it, restricting
monitoring to the smallest possible network, and ensuring
that measuring tools do not store the full packets to disk.
Burstein discusses the legal issues surrounding cyberse-
curity research, and in particular research using network
traces, running malware honeypots, or mitigating attacks by
interfering with malicious systems [15].
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4 CASE STUDIES
The ethical and legal considerations of conducting and pub-
lishing academic research with data of illicit origin depends
on the context [124]. Many factors may come into play, such
as the type of data involved, the measurement techniques
used or the results of the research. Thus, ethical and legal
consideration must be conducted separately for each research
activity. This section presents a series of concrete case studies
where different kinds of data of illicit origin was used. We
do not attempt to provide a complete survey on each topic.
Instead, for each topic we consider recent and relevant work,
focussing on those that mention or expose interesting ethi-
cal issues. We selected from papers we were already aware
of, those we found from searches, and from following refer-
ences forwards and backwards. Decisions on which papers
to include were necessarily subjective. We consider work by
people who self-identify as researchers even if they do not
publish in academic venues, although we have focussed on
publications which have undergone peer review. We highlight
the ethical (e.g. Identification of stakeholders) and legal (e.g.
Computer misuse) issues defined in §2.1 and §3 in each case,
and the overall results are summarised in §5. We do not cover
research using active measurements such as the controversial
Encore work discussed by others [78].
4.1 Malware and exploitation
Research conducted using hacking tools such as botnets or
exploit kits is necessary to understand how malicious actors
use them and to provide countermeasures. However, the use
of such tools can be harmful, and sometimes researchers have
used them without considering legal or ethical issues. In this
section we cover three particular cases: the use of a botnet to
scan the IPv4 address space, the exploitation of a discovered
vulnerability to gather email addresses, and research using
source code of malware specimens.
4.1.1 Carna scan. In 2012 an anonymous individual claimed
to have carried out a complete scan of all IPv4 addresses on
all ports and made the dataset publicly available. However,
the means they used to do this was a botnet of 420000
devices with default passwords [18]. Creating a botnet of
compromised computers to carry out research is illegal since it
is Computer misuse. Is research that uses these data ethical?
CMU CERT wrote a blog post explaining how these data
could be used and, while they pointed out there were some
ethical issues, they noted that: “As far as we can tell, this
data set does not contain legally restricted information, like
classified information, personally identifiable information, or
trade secrets.” [99]. CAIDA found that there were some
problems with this data since some bot-devices were behind
HTTP proxies which meant that the results for port 80 scans
were incorrect [18]. They noted ethical concerns without giv-
ing details, and referred the reader to the Menlo report [26].
To prevent harm, CAIDA only looked at data targeting their
own darknet. Malécot and Inoue took a similar approach,
analysing their network telescope [70]. However, they then
realised that they knew the IP addresses of the botnet devices
as they were the sources of the probes of their network tele-
scope. These IP addresses thus once belonged to devices that
could be easily brute forced as they had weak Telnet pass-
words, in doing so the authors Identify harms. The Safeguards
they used were that they kept these IP addresses confidential
pending finding an ethically acceptable and practical way of
dealing with the situation.1
Krenc, Hohlfeld and Feldmann published a non-peer re-
viewed editorial note where they analysed the scan results [62].
They found numerous technical problems with the data, and
the authors concluded that given that Carna scan made no
technical contributions, it had been unethical to conduct.
While they did not provide an opinion on whether it is ethi-
cal to use these data for research, they did use it for these
purposes.
When these scan data were first released, it was not neces-
sary to use them to answer research questions as researchers
could conduct their own scans legally, ethically, and with
better technical validity. For new research that requires com-
parison with the Internet of 2012, these Carna scan data
might be of use. However, due to substantial technical prob-
lems with these Carna scan data [62] in many cases there
will be no good argument for using them.
Dittrich, Carpenter and Karir use the Menlo report to
present a thorough analysis of the ethics of the Carna bot-
net [27], from which they conclude that there is a “lack of
a common understanding of ethics in the computer security
field”.
4.1.2 AT&T iPad users database brute force. In 2010 re-
searchers from Goatse Security discovered a web service run
by AT&T that, when provided with the ICC-ID of a 3G
iPad, would return the associated email address. They used
this to obtain the email addresses for 114 000 iPad users
and passed this information to Gawker [106] as well as mak-
ing the vulnerability known to third parties. They did not
contact AT&T to report the vulnerability. The subsequent
FBI investigation [107] resulted in the authors being found
guilty of Computer misuse and one of them was sentenced
to 41 months imprisonment [30]. While it was argued that
this imprisonment was an overreaction [98] the research was
clearly both unethical and illegal.
Finding vulnerabilities in third party systems without
permission can be ethical, since this helps that party to
Identify harms and to avoid future attacks. However, in
this case it was unethical, because: i) The authors collected
far more personal data than they needed to prove it to
be a real vulnerability, ii) The authors shared this data
and the existence of the vulnerability (including the exploit
script) with third parties before reporting the problem to
AT&T. Hence, the authors identified risks for iPad users,
but exploited the vulnerability and, given that they did not
contact AT&T, they failed to implement Safeguards. Indeed,
1In 2016 the Mirai botnet was also built by brute forcing Telnet
passwords. As a security research community we did not successfully
mitigate the risks that the Carna botnet demonstrated [91]. We were
not able to contact Malécot and Inoue to discover if they found a
solution to ethically using the IP addresses.
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the research work is not in the Public interest, since they did
not minimise harm or maximise benefit, except to their own
notoriety (a lack of Justice).
4.1.3 Malware source code. Malware source code has been
publicly released on multiple occasions. This code has then
been used by malicious actors to attack computer systems or
networks. Additionally, malware source code can be obtained
from public databases such as vxHeaven or Contagio Dump.
For example, the source code for Zeus was leaked in 2011 [45].
Since then, many variants of Zeus have been reported by
anti-virus vendors. Similarly the source code for Mirai botnet
was released in 2016 [60]. The release of malware source
code often lowers the barrier to entry for using the malware:
after Mirai’s source code was released, myriad Mirai based
botnets began operation. Release of source code is sometimes
correlated with prosecution of its author, as in the example of
Agobot in 2004 [43]. Additionally, the release of source code
might result in changed business models for malware authors
such as the Zeus botnet as-a-service [45]. The source code of
malware can also be obtained from its operational settings.
Stone-Gross et al. [103] identified and obtained access to some
of the C&C servers for the Pushdo/Cutwail botnet (used
mainly for spam delivery) by contacting the hosting providers
(i.e. the authors first performed Identification of stakeholders).
They obtained sensitive data such as the statistics of infection,
target email addresses and the source code of the malware.
Kotov and Masacci collected source code of exploit kits
from a public repository as well as underground forums where
code was leaked or released [58]. Their analysis showed how
exploit kits evade anti-crawling techniques and how malware
authors protect against code analysis. However, as the au-
thors state, the fact that the code was leaked biased their
analysis, for example due to removal of obfuscation from the
source code. Calleja et al. analysed 151 malware samples
dating from 1975 to 2015. They show how the malware
landscape has evolved using traditional software metrics on a
dataset of malware code from various repositories, including
vxHeaven, GitHub, hacker-related magazines, and P2P net-
works. The authors do not share the collected source code,
but only provide a dataset containing the metrics obtained
from the malware pieces [17].
Research using malware source code has substantial ben-
efits as better understanding of how malware works, so as
to facilitate developing new detection and mitigation tech-
niques. Publishing the results and explaining the tools and
techniques used to analyse the malware makes this research
of Public interest. Both possession and accidental disclosure
of malware could be illegal. Researchers could use secure
storage, enforce retention policies, and not publicly distribute
the malware source code as Safeguards. However, none of
the research works using source code mentioned ethical or
legal issues, nor whether they have obtained permission from
their corresponding REB. Calleja et al. shared a dataset with
metrics from the source code, but not the sources themselves,
as Safeguards that allow for reproducibility without releasing
the malware [17]. Additionally, stylometry analysis allows
code writers to be identified [16]. By identifying who has
written some piece of code, it is possible to group malware
families, detect plagiarism, and attribute attacks. Thus, the
release of source code (not just malware code) should be done
with care, since it can be used to identify the authors.
4.2 Password dumps
Password dumps are the archetypal leaked dataset – a list
of passwords that has been been made public, normally by
illegal action; criminals regularly compromise databases (e.g.
by SQL injection) and then publish the contents online [120].
Since people include personal data in passwords, the password
alone can be sensitive [104] and the lists may also include
other personal data such as email addresses or names.
Research into password dumps is controversial but widely
practised [104], not least because they provide researchers
with ground truth data, that otherwise would be difficult
to obtain [32]. A variety of dumps have been investigated.
One of the largest dumps, is the RockYou dump, others
include MySpace leaked in 2006, or Facebook leaked in 2010.
These dumps and many others can be found online by using
common search engines.
Weir et al. use lists of compromised and publicly disclosed
passwords [121]. They say that “while publicly available, these
lists contain private data; therefore we treat all password
lists as confidential” and that “due to the moral and legal
issues with distributing real user information, we will only
provide the lists to legitimate researchers who agree to abide
by accepted ethical standards”. In a later paper by the same
authors they note that it is a “mixed blessing” that research
into passwords used for high value targets, such as bank
accounts, will not be possible until relevant breaches occur
and the data is made public [120].
Das et al. study trends in password reuse across different
sites by analysing passwords obtained through an internal
survey and several hundred thousand leaked passwords [24].
They state that the ethics of conducting research with data
acquired illegally is under debate, but they justify their work
saying that: 1) these datasets were used in several previous
studies, 2) they protected users privacy by only working
with hashed email addresses, 3) they obtained approval from
their REB to conduct the survey. Finally, the authors state
that their results help system administrators and researchers
understand how cross-site password attacks work.
Kelley et al. used two datasets of leaked passwords as well
as passwords collected through an online survey [57]. The
authors received approval from their REB for this survey, and
they discuss the ethics of using leaked databases of passwords.
They argue that, given these data were already public, using
it for research does not increase harm to users, since no
further connection with real identities is sought. Moreover,
given that attackers can use these datasets to construct
their dictionaries or cracking tools, system administrators
can benefit from research and can prepare defences such as
improved password policies. This view is also shared by Ur
et al., who use three different password dumps to compare
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real-world cracking techniques with those proposed in the
research literature [114].
Durmuth et al. proposed OMEN, a cracking algorithm
that outperforms state of the art crackers [31]. The authors
tested their algorithm on leaked databases from MySpace,
Facebook and the website RockYou. The authors justify this
by claiming that these datasets have been used in several
previous studies, and they have been made public. Moreover,
they claimed that these data have been treated carefully and
they do not reveal actual information about the passwords.
Bonneau used leaked password databases to investigate
the statistical properties of passwords and developed the
α-guesswork metric for password strength [13]. He notes that
“care was taken to ensure that no activities undertaken for
research made any user data public which wasn’t previously”
and rejects “the appropriateness of ever collecting cleartext
user passwords, with or without additional identifying infor-
mation”. By this argument, leaking a password database and
making a leaked password database more available than it
would otherwise be are both unethical.
Researchers mostly use two arguments to justify the ethics
of conducting research on password dumps. First, since the
passwords are public, studying them might not increase harm
and could help advance science. Moreover, since attackers
may have access to these lists as well, the defences derived
from analysis of these passwords may protect people, making
these works of Public interest. Second, most authors state
that they do not reveal personal information derived from
the passwords, and some of them claim that they “treat
these lists with the necessary precautions” [31] or that they
“treat them as confidential” [121], which should include secure
storage of the lists. All the works covered Identify harms and
provide Safeguards. Some authors justify the ethics of their
research on the basis that previous research was conducted
with these dumps.
Some uses of leaked password databases are clearly not
ethical. leakedsource.com was shut down and its operators
arrested as a result of its use of leaked passwords [61]. It
made password hashes (or even cracked passwords) available
to anyone who was willing to pay for the access. This is in
marked contrast to the ethical service haveibeenpwned.com
which never makes passwords available and doesn’t expose
any personal information without verification of control of
the email address for that leaked information [44]. havei-
beenpwned.com maximises benefit by enabling users to find
out if their data has been leaked and notifying them if their
data is leaked in the future while minimising harm as it does
not share private data with anyone or use it for any other
purpose.
4.3 Leaked databases
While password dumps are a specific restricted form of data,
in this section we consider more general leaking of entire
databases that contain more detailed information such as
messages or logs of activity. These databases are available in
underground forums or from public repositories, sometimes
for free. In this section, we cover three cases: Databases
of distributed denial of service (DDoS) providers (booters),
the Patreon database (a web site aimed at crowd-founding
projects), and the databases of several underground forums.
4.3.1 Booter databases leak. Booters (sometimes called
stressers) provide DDoS-as-a-Service. While their operators
might sometimes claim that this is legal [46], this activity
is almost always illegal2 (Computer misuse), and it is also
unethical. Several approaches have been used to understand
this criminal ecosystem: interviewing operators after contact-
ing them through their websites [46], measuring the attacks
they produce [110], and using their leaked databases and
source code. Karami et al. analysed a database dump of the
TwBooter service. Their Safeguards to make this research
ethical were to not publish personally identifiable data, ex-
cept when this was already publicly known [54]. Later they
analysed database dumps from Asylum and LizardStresser
and scraped data from VDOS [55]. For the latter they ob-
tained an REB exemption on the basis these data did not
contain any personally identifiable information and used pub-
licly leaked data. In some jurisdictions (e.g. Germany [115])
IP addresses may be personally identifiable data and the
dumps likely contained email addresses which can be simi-
larly identifiable. Santanna et al. analysed database dumps
from 15 distinct booters and used Karami’s procedures to
justify it ethically [93]. Thomas et al. used database dumps
and scraped data from booters to evaluate the coverage of
their honeypot based measurement of DDoS attacks, they
argued that using this data was necessary as there was no
other ground truth on attacks initiated by booters [110].
All these papers had some Identification of stakeholders,
Identify harms and used Safeguards. These dumps can con-
tain details of user accounts including names, email addresses,
password hashes and security questions; details of the backend
and frontend servers used for attacks (including compromised
hosts); logs of connections to the site including IP addresses
and user agent strings; logs of attacks including target IP
addresses, ports, domain names and the method used; tickets
and messages sent between users and site owners; records of
payments; details of pricing plans; and chat logs of site oper-
ators. Concretely, Thomas et al. used the attack logs [110];
Santanna et al. [93] and Karami et al. [55] used attack logs,
payment records, pricing plans and counts of users. The
password hashes could be used for password research and the
ticket databases for qualitative research into the attitudes of
booter users and operators [46].
4.3.2 Patreon crowd-funding. In October 2015 the Patreon
crowd-funding website was hacked and the entire site made
available. This included data on projects, private messages,
source code, email addresses, and passwords. Poor and
Davidson, who were conducting research based on incomplete
data obtained by scraping the Patreon website would have
2The aim is usually illegal: attempting to stop someone’s Internet
connection from working; and the mechanism is often also illegal: using
UDP amplification attacks that make unauthorised use of misconfig-
ured UDP servers or using botnets of compromised machines.
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liked to use this data but concluded it would be unethical
to do so [85]. These data were publicly available and the
researchers hoped to serve the public through their research.
However, it would be hard for them to distinguish between
public and private data within the dump, and they might see
private data unintentionally. Furthermore using the dump
might legitimize criminal activity, violate user’s expectations
of privacy, and the use of this data would be without their
consent. Importantly they also did not need to use this
data to do their research, as scraping the Patreon website
would also provide the data they needed, without the risk
of accidentally including private data. This is an example
where the authors Identify harms and chose not to use data
of illicit origin as a result since they could not ensure that
there would be no additional harm.
4.3.3 Underground forums. Underground forums focus on
trading, learning and discussing illegal or criminal topics, such
as hacking material, credit cards and drugs. These forums
often also cover other non-illegal topics, such as video-games,
financial help, politics, and sport.
Several forum databases have been leaked in the past. The
w0rm.ws forum database was hacked by an anonymous group
of hackers under the pseudonym “Peace of Mind”, allegedly in
response to some prior attack on the forum “Hell” [116]. All
the forum content, personal data, as well as exploits and hack-
ing material was made public. The database of carders.cc, a
German forum focused on financial information trading (such
as credit cards or bank accounts) was hacked and leaked [59].
In 2016, the database of the forum nulled.io was leaked,
containing “536064 user accounts with 800593 user per-
sonal messages, 5 582 purchase records and 12 600 invoices
which seem to include donation records” [90]. Motoyama et
al. presented one of the first works analysing underground
forums using leaked databases, however, they did not discuss
ethics [76]. Yip et al. perform social network analysis using
a database of three carding forums (Cardersmarket, Dark-
market and Shadowcrew) which included private messages
of the participants [123]. This research showed that forums
are a preferred way for criminals to communicate. They
do not provide any discussion about the ethics of their re-
search, however they indicate that the marketplace actors are
anonymous, so it is not possible to obtain Informed consent.
Analysing data from underground forums can provide valu-
able insights into how markets for stolen data work [47], how
malware configurations are shared [45], new forms of criminal
networks that arise in cyberspace [76], common goods and
assets being traded [86], economy of spam campaigns [103]
or even to provide Indicators of Compromise (IoC) and other
useful information for threat intelligence [69, 92]. This makes
it of Public interest. Indeed, the conclusions drawn from these
works are undoubtedly valuable to law enforcement agencies
and crime prevention strategies that arise as a result can
provide social benefits (e.g. preventing terrorist attacks, cy-
berattacks, or child sexual exploitation). However, there
are other ethical considerations: the research should con-
sider potential harms to the users of the forums, including
prosecution or physical threat, and compare them with the
benefits. None of the works mentioned use Safeguards to
protect the data, which was originally illegally obtained [116].
Some authors have publicly re-released leaked datasets, even
including private information [14, 86]. While the goal is to
provide other researchers with datasets to conduct their ex-
periments and for reproducibility, public release means that
these datasets are potentially being shared with malicious
actors.
4.4 Financial data leaks
Leaks of commercially sensitive data such as data on contracts
and client relationships can reveal the hidden behaviour of
companies and individuals in ways that would be difficult
to achieve through external measurement. In this section
we describe the leak of data from a law firm that revealed
the financial behaviour of companies and individuals. Leaks
of peering arrangements between ISPs together with traffic
statistics likely present similar ethical issues, particularly if
the data demonstrate illegal behaviour such as contravening
network neutrality rules or the imposition of censorship.
Panama / Mossack Fonseca papers leak. In 2015 the internal
database of the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca was
leaked to the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, which
shared it with the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists (ICIJ) [109]. In 2016 the consortium and its
partners released numerous reports based on analysis of the
leaked data [42]. World leaders, celebrities, and companies
were found to be using Mossack Fonseca’s services for tax
evasion and other criminal purposes. Some of these data were
made publicly available and Europol identified 3500 crimi-
nals among the clients of the firm using this data [84]. There
was a substantial Public interest to this release as it identified
criminal and unethical activity by numerous individuals and
companies. This revelation may result in money laundering
and tax evasion becoming more difficult in future due to
greater transparency, international cooperation, and fear of
disclosure. However, not all the clients of Mossack Fonseca
were engaged in illegal or unethical behaviour. Trautman
surveys the consequences of the leak describing many of the
media reports and investigations that resulted from it [111].
Murphy states that money laundering and tax evasion are
illegal, while tax avoidance is unethical [77]. He says tax is
the rightful property of the government, tax evasion is the
theft of the government’s rightful property, and tax avoidance
is a “con trick”. Promoting tax competition between countries
is seeking to undermine national sovereignty and subvert the
democratic (or other political) process and hence unethical.
The Guardian reports that 95% of Mossack Fonseca’s work
involves selling financial products to avoid taxes [42] and
hence almost all of the work they do would be described by
Murphy as unethical.
The Panama papers have been of interest to researchers,
as well as journalists, and law enforcement. Sharife uses the
Panama papers in a historical analysis to understand the
downfall of Banco Espírito Santo [97]. Walkowski uses the
Ethical issues in research using datasets of illicit origin IMC ’17, November 1–3, 2017, London, UK
Panama papers to argue for reform in legislation to increase
transparency and avoid tax competition [117]. O’Donovan
et al. evaluated the impact of the Panama papers on firm
values and found it reduced market capitalisation of 397
firms implicated in the leak by US$135 billion or 0.7% [79].
Omartian used the Panama papers to investigate investor
response to changes in tax legislation in terms of offshore
entity usage [82]. He uses the introduction of legislation:
European Union Savings Directive (EUSD), Tax Information
Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act (FATCA), and the Common Reporting Stan-
dard for information exchange (CRS) as natural experiments,
evaluating the impact on offshore activity as revealed by the
Panama papers. He finds that they do have a significant
impact.
None of these papers explicitly discuss the ethics of using
this data; they implicitly argue that they are in the public
interest. O’Donovan et al. [79], and Oei and Ring [80] Identify
harms resulting from the data being released while Omartian
provides evidence for tax laws that provide more Justice [82].
McGregor et al. use the successful collaborative investiga-
tion into the Panama Papers that the ICIJ conducted as a
case study of secure collaboration [74]. They used a survey
of the journalists who used ICIJ’s systems and IRB approved
interviews of ICIJ’s staff but did not analyse the content of
the Panama Papers. They detail many of the safeguards
used to protect the data and the investigation.
4.5 Classified materials
In this section we cover two well-known leaks of classified
information: Manning’s Wikileaks dump and Snowden’s NSA
data leak. In both cases, classified documents from the USA
government detailing war decisions, espionage or diplomatic
activities were publicly leaked.
4.5.1 Manning’s WikiLeaks dump. In 2010 Chelsea (then
Bradley) Manning leaked 700 000 documents and diplomatic
cables from the USA’s government systems to WikiLeaks [73].
This information was available to more than three million
USA government employees [65] and so it is likely that other
parties such as Russia and China that have large intelligence
agencies would already have had access to at least some of this
information. Originally WikiLeaks shared the unredacted
documents with carefully selected journalists. However, later
journalists published what they believed to be a temporary
encryption password only to discover that a copy of the
archive encrypted under that password had been shared on
BitTorrent [7]. Hence, the full and unredacted cables were
publicly released.
The use of WikiLeaks diplomatic cables and documents
in the academy is controversial. For example, professors
do not agree on the morality of using this information for
teaching foreign policy studies, despite the cables being a
valuable teaching tool [25]. Barnard “borrowed” classified
documents from the “controversial WikiLeaks” to analyse
covert relationships between USA and South Africa during
the Cold War [9]. The author claims that there were no
ethical dilemmas since all the classified data used was open
source and declassified. However, there is no evidence that
any of Manning’s WikiLeaks dump has been declassified.
Talarico and Zamparini analysed the smuggling of tobacco in
Italy between 2004 and 2014 [105]. They used a confidential
document from the American Embassy in Italy, obtained
through WikiLeaks that said that the USA government had
blacklisted an Italian harbour because of collusion by harbour
staff. Berger references several Manning cables to study the
international restrictions on the trade of weapons with North
Korea [12]. For example, Berger mentioned that the United
Arab Emirates bought missiles from North Korea, and a
diplomatic cable where USA thanked Iran for its cooperation
in blocking one cargo from North Korea.
Researchers have used this data to better understand the
diplomatic position of the USA government in several inter-
national conflicts. As Barnard points out, these documents
are controversial [9]. However, none of the studied works
discussed the ethics of their research. Some consider Manning
as a traitor while others consider her as a freedom fighter. In
the research community, there is no consensus as to whether
publishing results based on these documents is ethical, and
in general, authors prefer not to confront the question.
4.5.2 Snowden’s NSA data leak. In 2013 Edward Snow-
den, a contractor for the USA’s National Security Agency
(NSA), leaked large amounts of NSA and GCHQ data to
journalists [8]. He was the latest in a long line of NSA leakers
who have revealed various aspects of NSA programmes [122].
Landau provides an overview of the data that was revealed by
Snowden, covering early leaks [64] and later leaks [63]. She
criticises the ethics of some of the leaks since “the specifics
on China had little to do with privacy and security of indi-
viduals”, but is mostly critical of the NSA/GCHQ and the
USA and UK governments, and she is mostly positive about
Snowden’s actions.
Several uses of the Snowden leaks make no mention of the
ethical considerations of doing so, but are implicitly critical
of the ethics of the activities exposed. In a newspaper article,
Schneier uses documents leaked by Snowden to explain how
the NSA unconditionally exploits Tor users’ browsers to
install implants that exfiltrate data [95]. In a magazine article
he argues that the metadata collection that was exposed
represents ubiquitous surveillance of everyone [96]. RFC 7624
uses the Snowden leaks to inform a threat model for pervasive
surveillance, in order to inform protocol design, such that
the activities detailed in the Snowden leaks would be more
difficult in future [10]. Lustgarten argued in 2015 that the
American Psychological Association had not taken account of
the Snowden leaks in its ‘Ethics Code’ and ‘Record Keeping
Guidelines’ as the leaks showed that the NSA would have
access to client data stored on cloud servers. Clinicians were
responsible for protecting this client data, and had legal
protections against enforced disclosure. This then raises
ethical concerns for psychologists, as their clients would not
have given informed consent for access to their data by the
NSA [67].
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Others used the fact that the leaks had happened and their
impact rather than the actual content of the leaks for their
research. Preibusch used Snowden’s revelations to conduct an
experiment on the privacy behaviour of people after a major
privacy incident; he found little change in user behaviour [87].
There has been substantial discussion of whether Snow-
den’s actions were legal and ethical and whether the NSA’s
activities were legal or ethical. Scheuerman argues that
Snowden’s actions were ethical civil disobedience and serve
as an example of correct behaviour [94]. Kadidal describes
the impact on civil liberties of mass surveillance based on
what Snowden (and others) revealed [53]. Walsh and Miller
provide an ethical and policy analysis of intelligence agency
activity on the basis of Snowden’s revealing what current
practice was [118]. Lucas discusses the application of the
principle of informed consent to mass surveillance as revealed
by Snowden, suggesting that revealing the outline of what
kind of activity is being conducted to the public is necessary
for the public to consent to it [66]. Barnett argues that
the NSA’s activities revealed in the Snowden leaks were un-
constitutional under the fourth amendment [11]. Inkster, a
former British Secret Intelligence Service Director, provides a
counter-narrative, claiming that the exposed activities were
not illegal, but rather entirely proper, in particular he states
that collecting data on everyone is not mass surveillance if
this data is only processed by computer programs and not
read by humans [51]. He implicitly argues that the newspa-
pers that published the leaked data acted unethically in doing
so and Snowden’s actions are clearly depicted as unethical
and illegal.
Since the leaked data was classified, and much of it remains
classified despite being publicly available, the use of it for
research or in court cases may have unexpected difficulties.
For example, in 2015 Barton Gellman gave a talk at Purdue
University that included some classified NSA slides. Pur-
due University had a facility security clearance to perform
classified USA government research and this incident was
treated as a classified information spillage. As a result, the
video recording of the talk was destroyed [36]. There is thus
an additional risk for researchers at institutions with facility
security clearances as if they work with leaked classified data
then they may find that all their resulting work is destroyed
by facility authorities. In 2017 the UK government was
considering making it an offence to obtain sensitive infor-
mation, and if that became law then any researcher using
leaked classified data could be imprisoned, possibly for up
to 14 years [34]. In the USA court cases have been thrown
out because the evidence that the government had the sup-
plicants under surveillance was classified (even though the
supplicants had that evidence) [53]. In contrast, the Vault 7
leak of CIA data [68] contained data that might be expected
to be highly compartmentalised Top Secret (source code for
weaponised zero day exploits), but, due to the fact that if it
were classified it could not be deployed on enemy systems,
it was unclassified. Additionally, as the USA government
cannot own copyrights, the source code for this state level
malware was not even protected by copyright [5]. The lack
of legal protections might make it easier for researchers to
work with this data.
5 ANALYSIS
In this section we analyse the case studies with respect to
the ethical and legal considerations described in Sections 2.1
and 3. We first discuss common justifications made by au-
thors to justify the use (or not) of these data. The main goal
is to understand how the authors approached the legal and
ethical issues as well as the justifications, safeguards, harms,
and benefits. A summary of this analysis is shown in Table 1.
The acronyms used for safeguards, harms and benefits in the
table are given in brackets below.
5.1 Justifications
We have observed common justifications made by the re-
searchers regarding ethical issues in the case studies, which
are summarized in Table 1. Here, we describe them and
provide comments in italics.
Not the first Previous research using these data was pub-
lished and peer-reviewed, and so our work must be ethical.
This is a poor argument: not all published work is ethical un-
der current norms, and while the work that was published may
have been ethical, if your work does something different with
these data then that requires its own justification. Public
data Since these data are publicly available, anything we do
with these data is ethical. The ethics of the work must still
be considered and in some cases REB review may still be re-
quired [32]. Researchers may develop or apply new techniques
to public data that, for example, deanonymise these data,
and this may cause harm [4]. No additional harm Any
harms that might arise have already occurred and therefore
our work produces benefits and no (or negligible) additional
harm it is ethical. For there to be no additional harms the
research should not identify any natural persons and data
may need to be stored and managed securely. In some cases
any use of the data of illicit origin is considered additional
harm, for example with images of child abuse, every viewing is
considered additional abuse of the victim. Fight malicious
use These data are already used by malicious actors, and so
we also need to use these data to defend against them. If
researchers can use the same data to prevent or reduce harm
caused by malicious actors, without creating greater harm by
doing so, then it may be ethical to do so. Necessary data
This research cannot be conducted without using this data.
This might be a good justification if there is sufficient benefit
to the work (Public interest) and there is no additional harm.
5.2 Safeguards
When dealing with leaked data, holders must take care as to
how it is processed and stored so as to avoid further disclosure
of sensitive information. Here we analyse the actions taken
by the researchers to maintain the confidentiality, integrity
and privacy of these data and the stakeholders. Secure
storage (SS) to protect the integrity and confidentiality
of these data maintained, e.g. by means of encryption and
Ethical issues in research using datasets of illicit origin IMC ’17, November 1–3, 2017, London, UK
access control to avoid accidental leakage. Privacy (P) No
deanonymisation is attempted and no identities are revealed.
Controlled Sharing (CS) Researchers publish only partial
/ anonymised data, provide it under legal agreements that
prevent harms or do not make these data publicly available.
This includes approaches such as letting researchers visit the
institution holding the data to analyse it, or the holding
institution performing analysis on behalf of other researchers,
such as by running their code.
5.3 Harms
Conducting research using data containing sensitive informa-
tion entails risks dependant on the consequences of the data
gathering, the research itself, or any further leakage of these
data maintained by the researchers. In general only harms
to natural persons (rather than corporate persons), or to the
environment, are considered during ethical review. Illicit
measurement (I) Research obtained these data by means
of illicit activities such as hacking or paying the offenders,
which can lead to researchers being prosecuted. Potential
Abuse (PA) Research results from these data can be used
by malicious actors to cause additional harm, for example by
means of designing evasive malware or updating password
cracking policies. De-Anonymization (DA) Research on
these data can be used to de-anonymise or re-identify people
or networks. Also, identification of group of individuals may
raise ethical concerns such as discrimination or violence to-
wards identified groups [35]. Sensitive Information (SI)
These data contains sensitive and private information, which
can be used to harm natural persons. For example, if the
user password from one service is leaked, their credentials to
other services can be compromised due to password reuse [24].
Researcher Harm (RH) The research can lead to the re-
searchers being prosecuted by law enforcement, since these
data may include illegal material. Researchers could be
threatened by criminals, e.g. in underground forums [72],
or by state or industry actors that dislike the work. There
may also be a risk of emotional trauma to researchers if
they come across distressing content, such as pornography
or violence, during the work. Behavioural Change (BC)
The research can change the behaviour of the stakeholders
of these data, which may have negative consequences. For
example, a market vendor can provide fake information if
she knows that she is being measured [101]. Alternatively
the research may encourage future collection or use of data
of illicit origin.
5.4 Benefits
In this section, we enumerate academic and social benefits
particular to research using data of illicit origin. Repro-
ducibility (R) The data allows the comparison of different
algorithms or tools. This is the great benefit of data sharing,
but Controlled Sharing is required when these data con-
tains sensitive information. Uniqueness (U) Data is either
unique (cannot be obtained through other means) or histori-
cal (can no longer be obtained by other means), so similar
measurements on the same topic are hard or even impossible
to attain. This only becomes a benefit if the data is also
useful. Defence Mechanisms (DM) Data can be used to
study the underground economy, new forms of cybercrime
or new attack techniques. This allows new defences to be
designed, such as anti-malware tools or efficient password
policies. Anthropology and Transparency (AT) Data
contains ground truth on the behaviour of human beings,
which other methods could only obtain in a filtered or biased
way. For example, data can reveal real human behaviour
when creating passwords without the reporting bias of sur-
veys or experiments with human participants. Additionally,
data can provide transparency through information that aids
understanding of government surveillance activities, exter-
nal relationships, or of company behaviour. The additional
transparency into state or corporate actors may have greater
benefits than if the data concerned individuals, as it may have
additional public benefit by providing checks and balances
on power.
5.5 Discussion
We observe a wide variation in the ethical issues mentioned
by the authors and their justifications for using these data,
even when they are using the same data. This is clear from
studying Table 1. Two works stated that they were exempt
from REB approval, two received REB approval and 24 did
not mention REBs. The reasons given for exemption were:
no human subjects or ethical concerns [110]; no personally
identifiable information (despite email addresses and IPs)
and public data [55]. Both of these works used Safeguards to
mitigate potential Harms and have clear ethical justifications.
These exemptions are all based on the absence of direct
human subjects. However, in each case they were measuring
human behaviour and if they had tried to identify individuals
they might have been successful. The absence of human
subjects appears an artificial distinction in these cases, as
there were human participants. Both of the papers that
received REB approval [57, 24] obtained it not because of
their usage of data of illicit origin, but because they also
conducted surveys or other human subject research. Not
having REB approval solely on the basis that data is public
is contrary to the opinions of experts [32], since this data
may contain private information.
Explicit ethics sections were included in 12 of the 28 pa-
pers. However, since we specifically selected papers for this
table because they talked about ethics, this is unlikely to
be representative. Nonetheless, it does show that a high
proportion of papers using data of illicit origin do already
have ethics sections. We do not have enough information
to show any trend in this behaviour, and because we would
expect this behaviour to be field dependent, we would need
a large representative sample from each field to be able to
show any trend.
Discussion of safeguards, harms and benefits in the papers
is highly variable. We included those that were implicitly or
explicitly discussed in the papers. However, we are aware
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AT&T database [106]a 10 • • 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 I,PA,SI,RH
Pushdo/Cutwail botnet [103] 11 • • • 3 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 R,U,DM
30 exploit kits [58] 13 • • 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 DM,AT
Carna Scan [18]a 13 • 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 3 5 5
[70] 13 • 5 3 3 5 3 5 3 5 5 3 3 5 P,CS PA
[62]a 14 • 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 5
[27]b 14 • 3 3 3 3 3 3 ∅ RH,BC










MS + 2 others [121] 09 • • 5 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 SS,P,CS SI,BC R,DM
MS,RY + 4 others [57] 12 • • 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 3 3 P SI DM
MS,YV,FB + 7 others [24] 14 • • 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 3 5 3 3 P SI DM,AT
MS,RY,YV [114] 15 • • 5 3 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 5 5 5 P SI DM









6 underground forums [76] 11 • • • • • 3 3 5 3 3 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 U,DM,AT
3 carding forums [123] 13 • • • • 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 DM,AT
TwBooter [54] 13 • • • 3 3 3 5 5 3 3 3 5 5 3 5 P SI
TwBooter, 14 others [93] 13 • • • 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 3 5 P SI
Asylum, Lizard, Vdos [55] 15 • • • 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 3 5 5 3 E P SI
Patreon [85]c 16 • • • 3 3 3 3 3 5 3 l 5 3 3 ∅ SI,RH U,AT
Vdos, CMDBooter [110] 17 • • 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 3 5 3 3 E P,CS SI,BC U,AT











Manning Wikileaks [12] 15 • • • • 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
[9]a 16 • • • • 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 3 5
[105] 17 • • • • 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Snowden NSA leaks [64] 13 • • • • • 5 5 5 5 3 5 3 5 5 3 5 5
[95]a 13 • • • • • 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
[10] 15 • • • • • 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 3d5 5 5








Mossack Fonseca [82] 16 • • • • 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 DM
database [79] 16 • • • • 5 3 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 BC
a These works were not peer reviewed. b This paper analysed the ethics of the Carna scan and its use, but did not use it. c The authors did not use
the leaked database. d Here the argument is that the NSA is the malicious actor. e MS: MySpace, RY: RockYou, FB: Facebook, YV: Yahoo Voices
Table 1: Summary of the legal/ethical issues and the justifications made by the authors for each paper. Legal
issues are defined in §3, ethical issues in §2.1 and justifications in §5.1. • means that the legal issue is
applicable (even if it was not discussed). 3 means the issue was discussed or the justification was used, 5
means it was not. l means that the authors decided that the work could not be justified and did not use
the dataset. In the REB approval column, ∅ means not applicable and E means exempt. Safeguards: SS
Secure Storage, P Privacy, CS Controlled Sharing. Harms: I Illicit measurement, PA Potential Abuse, DA
De-Anonymization, SI Sensitive Information, RH Researcher Harm, BC Behavioural Change. Benefits: R
Reproducibility, U Uniqueness, DM Defence Mechanisms, AT Anthropology and Transparency.
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that many more would apply but they were not mentioned
explicitly. In general, we observe that researchers appear to
be more reluctant to express the potential harms resulting
from their work than their benefits.
Privacy preservation is one of the safeguards applied most
frequently, since it is easy to do (e.g. by refusing to attempt
to de-anomymize a data set or refusing to reveal private
information). Only four of the papers discussed controlled
sharing (CS). To provide the maximum benefit, papers need
to be reproducible and so while open data is often not appro-
priate for data of illicit origin, controlled sharing of data with
researchers is important. It is possible the authors would
be willing to share if they were asked, but mentioning this
increases the likelihood it will happen. There is a cost in
controlled sharing as it places a burden on the authors of
the work to put a robust legal framework in place and an
ongoing cost of vetting requests to access the data. However,
this cost can be delegated, for example using initiatives such
as IMPACT [49] in the USA or the Cambridge Cybercrime
Centre [20] in the UK.
6 CONCLUSION
It is common to see research using data of illicit origin, such
as leaked databases or classified documents. The use of
these data provide researchers with the opportunity to test
their hypotheses against ground truth data. For example, it
improves our understanding of the evolution of malware or
how users re-use passwords. This in turn helps to improve
cyber defenses or password policies. However, these data
were originally collected by illicit means, and the research
community must be aware of the ethical considerations of
using such data.
By analysing current advice and previous work on ethics,
we have drawn out a set of ethical issues that should be
considered and reported when publishing results based on
data of illicit origin. However, we have shown that there is
a lack of consistency in the consideration of ethical issues,
which results in cases where insufficient safeguards are used
to prevent harm. Few authors consulted their institution
REB, and in most cases they were exempted on the basis
that there were no human subjects involved in the research.
This narrow focus on whether the research involves “human
subjects”, rather than a risk based analysis of the potential
harms to human participants is unhelpful. If research has
potential to harm humans, even in absence of direct human
subjects, REB approval should be sought. REBs may need to
adapt to understand the possible affect on humans of research
in Information Communication Technology Research (ICTR),
and to provide timely and well informed responses.
In any case, papers using data of illicit origin should al-
ways have an ethics section, explaining how these data were
obtained, how it has been protected, analysing the harms,
benefits, and need for using such data. Conferences and
journals should explicitly require such ethics sections and
highlight the importance of considering ethics in their Calls
for Papers. Researchers using data that has been shared
with them under acceptable usage policies should, as Allman
and Paxson suggest, cite the acceptable usage policy they
are operating under [4]. Data providers should make their
acceptable usage policies publicly available so that they can
be cited. Additionally, current efforts to advise on ethics,
such as the Menlo Report [28], should be updated and ex-
tended to provide a more comprehensive coverage of ICTR
and legal considerations to guide researchers aiming to use
datasets of illicit origin. Ethics is an issue that is receiving
greater interest within ICTR and standards are improving.
Hence, we are hopeful that in the future better information
on current practice, and better guidance, will be available.
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